In the middle of 1989, the situation suddenly changed, and China's entry into the GATT process turned sharply downward.

The originally scheduled meeting of the China Working Group has been repeatedly postponed until the end of the year. The originally planned agenda is to discuss issues in the China Protocol, but the United States and the European Union have asked China to continue clarifying issues in the foreign trade system, saying that discussing the Protocol is not the will of the majority of members. Chairman Gillard had to add a conditional adverbial clause to the established agenda of "discussing issues in the Chinese protocol", which became "if feasible, discussing issues in the Chinese protocol". The work of the working group suddenly returned to the original point.

The attitude of the United States is like turning a book. "The United States will no longer play a leading role in China's negotiations to return to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)." The enthusiasm and expectations of Mr. Hu Jintao a few months ago have disappeared, and he directly stated to the Chinese side that the United States Congress has a strong sentiment towards China and it is impossible to grant China unconditional most favored nation treatment, The US government previously promised to urge Congress to amend relevant legislation, which could not be achieved. Finally, Article 35 of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) will be cited and China will not apply the GATT to each other.

At this very moment, more complex issues emerged.

On January 1, 1990, General Agreement Director General Dunkel received an application letter signed by Minister of Economy Dr. Chen Luan requesting his government to represent the customs regions of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen, and Matsu to apply for accession to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Chen Luan is a second generation official. His father, Chen Cheng, is a former chairman of the Taiwan Provincial Government and a leader of the Kuomintang, known as the "Chairman of the Committee". Upon receiving information, the Chinese Ambassador to Geneva immediately met with Director General Dunkel and submitted a diplomatic note stating that the Taiwan authorities have no right to apply for accession to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade on their own, and that the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade should not accept Taiwan's illegal applications.

Arthur Dunkel, a Swiss, was the third director-general of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). During his tenure, he experienced two major events: China's application for the restoration of GATT seats and the drafting of the Uruguay Round negotiating text (historically known as the "Dunkel text"), laying a solid foundation for China's entry into the GATT and the establishment of the WTO. Unlike Gillard, the Swiss chairman of the working group, Dunkel is tall and thin, with a slightly arched back and presbyopic glasses permanently perched on the top of his towering nose. He is an old smoker, always smoking continuously, with a yellowish complexion and occasional congestion in his throat when speaking. In my spare time, I wrote a book on the rules of the General Agreement and its relationship with China, compiled an English catalog and summary, and sent it to Dunkel for a preface. He not only readily agreed, but also asked me to send the book to the General Agreement library after it was published.

As the head of the General Agreement, as a Swiss from a mere six million small countries at that time, and as a major eastern country with a population of one fifth of the world's population, Dunkel must have been happy to see it happen, but perhaps he did not anticipate the complexity of the China issue. The General Agreement is not a subsidiary organ of the United Nations, but Dunkel, as Director General, naturally follows the unwritten rules and traditions of the General Agreement that "political issues come from the United Nations.". In the face of Taiwan's application letter, the General Agreement has not taken any action for the time being.

Arthur Dunkel (1932-2005) was Director General of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade from 1980 to 1993.

However, some contracting parties are experiencing undercurrent.

In September 1989, the Brookings Institution of the United States held a seminar at which the President of the Taiwan Policy Research Institute, surnamed Ye, published an article entitled "Taiwan's Membership in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)", analyzing several different memberships in the GATT and creating momentum for Taiwan. The United States' contribution to Taiwan's entry into the General Agreement is evident. After Taiwan submitted the application letter, due to strong pressure from China, the Taiwan issue was temporarily put on hold in the General Agreement, but the work of the China Working Group has almost stalled.

After taking note of Director General Dunkel, the next step is to do the work of various diplomatic missions in Geneva on the Taiwan issue. At that time, I followed the deputy representative of the mission, Minister Wang Tiance, to visit various missions. "Let's go, clear the mines!" Lao Wang is the director of the International Department of the Ministry of Economic and Trade at home and my immediate supervisor. He called visiting various missions to eliminate hidden dangers in the Taiwan issue "mine sweeping.". During the following year or more, the Chinese delegation, both young and old, traveled through the streets of Geneva to meet, visit, and meet with ambassadors, envoys, counsellors, and interim representatives of over 40 countries in Geneva, reaffirming to them General Assembly resolution 2758, the one China principle. All delegations understood China's concerns and stated that they would report this major issue to the capital.

The members of the General Agreement include sovereign countries, as well as "separate customs areas". A few months before China submitted to resume its seat in the General Agreement, in April 1986, Hong Kong became the 91st contracting party to the General Agreement, both as a separate customs territory and under the name "Hong Kong, China". In the eyes of legal people, the contracting power and membership of the General Agreement is another interesting legal issue. The General Agreement is both an international organization and an international treaty, and the conclusion of an international treaty is the act of a sovereign government. Why can regions without a sovereign nature also participate?

When drafting the GATT, some suzerain countries, such as Britain, France, and the Netherlands, not only negotiated tariff concessions for their own countries, but also negotiated for their overseas colonies. However, individual colonies, such as Myanmar, Ceylon (Sri Lanka), and South Rhodesia (later Zimbabwe) at the time, implemented tariff rates and trade systems different from those of the United Kingdom, and required to become separate contracting parties in the negotiations. The General Agreement specifically reviewed and identified the three parties as highly autonomous in trade and as separate customs areas, agreeing that they could become independent contracting parties to the United Kingdom after the negotiations were concluded. Shortly after the negotiations, Myanmar's Ceylon gained independence from colonial rule and became a contracting party as a sovereign state, while South Rhodesia remained a contracting party as a separate customs territory until its independence in 1980.

Due to the non sovereign nature of individual tariff areas and their lack of international contracting capacity, Chile and the Czech Republic have questioned the contracting capacity of individual tariff areas in international law when discussing accepting them as contracting parties. Given that the General Agreement is a very small group of agreements dealing with tariff trade, most contracting parties advocate that individual tariff areas can participate in the General Agreement. In order to prevent separate tariff areas from being understood as countries or political entities, the General Agreement has made very cautious provisions for the participation of separate tariff areas in the General Agreement: First, separate tariff areas and other territories implement different tariff rates and trade systems. For the purpose of applying the General Agreement, the General Agreement treats such separate tariff areas as one contracting party; Note that it is not stated here that a separate customs territory is a contracting party, but is treated as a contracting party. Secondly, a separate customs territory can only be considered as a contracting party if it is proposed by the contracting party that bears international responsibility for it and declares that it has trade autonomy; Similarly, it is not stated here that a separate customs territory is a contracting party, but is considered a contracting party. In 1986, after such a proposal and declaration process, the United Kingdom made Hong Kong a contracting party. Similarly, Portugal made Macao a contracting party in 1991.

Whether it was Southern Rhodesia or Hong Kong and Macao in those years, their status as separate customs territories originated from their former colonial status. In other words, the origin, legislative history, and limited legal practice of the separate customs areas in the General Agreement are all related to the suzerain and the colony. When Taiwan proposed to join the General Agreement, it was no longer a colony. Can it constitute a separate customs area as defined in the General Agreement? In other words, even without a colonial background, Taiwan, as a separate customs territory, must be proposed and declared by a contracting party that bears international responsibility for it before it can be considered a contracting party. Who will be the contracting party that bears international responsibility?

To be continued

(This article is translated by software translator for reference only.)